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ESSE AND T H E A U T H O R OF T H E LIBER 
CONTEMPLA TIONISIN DEUM 
In an effort to understand, to some degree at least, the difficulties 
modern man experiences in the search for some kind of convincing 
rational demonstrations concerning the existence of a suprasensible 
realm, specifically the reality of a Divine Being, Jacques Mari tain 
at tr ibutes both the difficulties and the consequent failure to the absence 
from the consciousness of man today of a deep and true "sense of being." 
The absence of that sense and awareness of being seems to have infected 
in a very particular manner our knowledge of the physical world, or more 
accurately the knowledge gained in and by much of the physical sciences 
today. 1 In a striking contrast with modern physical thought, the scientific 
knowledge of the Ancients and the Mediaevals made it comparatively 
easy for them at least to begin to scale the heights of philosophical 
thought in that most important region of it known as Metaphysics. Their 
decided advantage in that respect was due in no small measure to that 
"sense of being which everywhere and always ruled their t h o u g h t . " 2 
The situation for Metaphysical inquiries was particuiarly beneficial 
dur ing medieval times because, generally speaking, a philosopher during 
the Middle Ages did not experience or labor under the almost dire need 
in which many a thinker finds himself today, of having to be almost 
rudely aroused and "awakened to the reality of existence and of his own 
exis tence. . . " 3 Almost in all cases on the other hand, we find that a 
Mediaeval philosopher was possessed of and by the "intuition of being 
and the implications it bears with i t . " 4 Matters , for instance, briefiy 
entered into in a book such as On Being and Essence by St. Thomas 
Aquinas would not have been a revelation to most of its readers. Wha t 
was investigated on its pages was not deerrted beyond the comprehension 
and unders tanding of the relatively young tyro who prepared the book, al-
most as a mat ter of course, in order to introduce the young students under 
his care to the mysterious realm, namen 'First Philosophy' by Aristotle. 
The themes treated by Aquinas are basic and constitute in part the heart 
of philosophy. Yet the treatise itself was not then as urgent as it might 
have been many centuries later when thinkers seemed to have ceased to 
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•nquire about its type of questions. This statement is not contradicted by 
the fact that we live today in a century in which, superficially at least, we 
have experienced a resurrection of metaphysical investigations as evidenced 
by what appears to be an almost plethora of writings that include in their 
titles the word 'being' or other terms tntimately connected with it. We 
need only to mention the names of Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre, 
Maritain and Gilson to recall that some of the best minds in philosophy 
today have in some way engaged the question of being. as attested by the 
titles of some of their outstanding works . 5 
A simple way to demostrate the importance for philosophy in general 
of analyses concerning being is to point to the fact that most 
philosophical schools and movements, as well as certain individual philo-
sophers, are frequently characterized by designations which supposedly 
indicate their attitude and understanding of being, even if sometimes they 
choose to speak of it by means of another name or term. 'Idealism' for 
example ordinarily describes a system of thought that seems consistently 
to identify what is real with what is thought, what is with what is thought 
or in thought, being with being thought. The same or another system may 
be spoken of as 'monistic' if it again consistently reduces being to unity 
or to oneness, being to being one, in such a way that no meaningful place 
remains for the multiplicity of substances outside of and other than the 
One Being or the One. Today it is quite common to come across the 
thought of a thinker or of a whole school referred to as 'essentialist' or 
'existentialist' according as it is presumed to reduce essence to existence 
or viceversa, or at least to assign such a decisive primacy to one or the 
other as to make the remaining one practically meaningless . 6 As is well 
known, this last way of describing individuals and schools has become 
very widespread as a result of the writings of the principal representatives 
of what today ordinarily goes by the name of 'Existentialism'. It is also 
well known that within this movement, and due in some measure to the 
influence of one or another type of Idealism or Relativism, 'existence' 
describes the condition of human existence. to the exclusion almost of a!l 
else that herefore may have been thought to exist. 
Man stands today in need of regaining a genuine intellectual 
appreciation of and feeling for the ontological roots and other basic 
aspects of the tremendous world of our experience. And if philosophy 
intends to remain true to its authentic character and to provide man with 
the human wisdom that it alone can yield, then it must come to realize 
again the fundamental importance for itself and for the human family ot 
a sound understanding and response to what is most basic in all that i s 
real, to what we capture and yet seem to conceal in the word 'being'. 
Unless it can be conclusively shown that men who preceded us have failed 
completely or have succeeded but little. it may not be pointless or 
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incorrect to recommend ourselves to a renewal of interest in the thought 
and in the writings of the most prominent of our mediaeval philosophical 
forbears. The philosopher-historian Etienne Gilson has never tired of 
insisting on what both he and others rightly consider the existential cha-
racter of the philosophical wisdom and vision of the Angelic Doctor. 
Were we to agree with Gilson however, in his appraisal of many, if not 
most, of the other outstanding Schoolmen, they would have to be conside-
red essentialist philosophers who spoke of being in terms that suggest a 
thorough reduction of it to only one of its constituent aspects, and that 
aspect not the most basic one, namely essence. 7 Doubtless we cannot but 
agree with the view that recognizes that the genius of Aquinas led him, in 
his writings, for the first time (some would add for the last t ime until very 
recently) to bring out in clear unmistakable terms and to insist on the 
primacy that belongs to existence, to the act-of-existing or the act-of-
being, to esse in any adequate and correct analysis of being o r of what 
i s . 8 Not that Aquinad denied, nor should we for that matter deny, the 
legitimate and indispensable role that essence, as a second constitutive 
element, has within the inner structure or the heart of any finite being. 
Essence had to and must still be taken into account, rather than denied 
or ignored, in a truly metaphysical analysis. But this does not permit us 
to forget that it is esse, the act-of-to-be as " the act of all acts, the per-
fection of all perfect ions" 9 that makes it possible for something actually 
to be or to exist, and therefore to deserve properly to be called 'being' . It 
is on its account that. the same thing has being or is a being, for the 
simple reason that is is the act-of-being or existence which makes of 
something more than just a possibility. Something is a reality or a being, 
precisely because it shares in or possesses in its own distinctive way an 
esse or a to-be through which and by means of which it exists or i s . 1 0 
Now, although it cannot be gainsaid that the writings of the Doctor 
of the Schools abound in statements and repeated allusions to the funda-
mental character of esse in things that are known as beings, in things 
that can rightly be said to be, it ought not to come as a total surprize to 
encounter other outstanding Mediaeval writers who had a striking feeling 
and admiration for, and vivid insights into that supreme value or 
perfection that is being, esse. or to-be. We may read in one of the 
writings of Aquinas that an object or a reality is denominates an 'ens\ 
that is a 'being' , because of the fact that it enjoys; has or is in esse.' ' But 
this certainly would not prohibit or prevent others from being as keenly 
aware and appreciative of that perfection of all perfections. without which 
neither we nor other realities would have or be anything to speak about 
for the simple reason that neither we nor they would then be anything at 
all. 
Besides Aquinas other Mediaeval thinkers and writers had well 
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learned the lesson taught by the Masters of Greek philosophy, Plato and 
Aristotle, that the summit of philosophy may be and is reached only when 
or after we arrive at Dialectics or First Philosophy. It is only then that a 
philosopher may truly say that he has come upon the knowledge of what 
truly is, of beings precisely as beings. How else would a Mediaeval 
metaphysician really go beyond a pure natural philosophy or a philosophy 
of nature, unless his intellectual vision was constantly directed towards 
the being of all that is, in order to come gradually and perseveringly to 
some grasp of the First Cause or Causes of what is most intimate to and 
basic in the constitution of anything that is, i.e., its being? Through its 
being already everything that is real, even if linked with a physical 
rnaterial nature, in a literal sense transcends the realm of nature, of what 
is purely physical, and may appropriately therefore, be looked upon as 
genuinely metaphysical, deep down in its roots. The metaphysical realm 
has always had a very particular meaning for those philosophers who with 
Aquinas, share in the heritage of Christian Wisdom. As Christian 
thinkers, our Mediaeval ancestors too had very early learned that theirs 
was a God Who Is, a God whose creative efficacy caused things to exist 
or to be from literally nothing and therefore, in an absolute fashion. 
Heretofore those things had been simply nothing for of and in themselves 
they had no being through which they might have existed. 
It is not a difficult task to show that Ramon Lull ought to be 
counted amongst those thirteenth and fourteenth century writers who 
developed and carried on within the authentic metaphysical tradition 
proper to Christian philosophy. This statement may come as a total 
surprize only to those who have read and known about him exclusively as 
ihe inventor of a combinatory Art that feebly anticipated the logical 
schemes of Leibnitz' Ars Combinatoria and of an Art that had failed to 
make much of an impression on one of the great initiators of Modern 
Philosophy, the Frenchman Rene D e s c a r t e s . 1 2 The surprize may be 
almost as great for other readers with a less superticial but still exclusive 
acquaintance with the erstwhile better known Lullian Art. But it should 
be minimal or non-existent at all in students and readers familiar with at 
least a few of the principal writings of Lull, outside of those related to his 
famous Art. Perhaps the quickest and easiest way to convince any one of 
Lull's impressive and contagious 'sense of being', such that we may 
rightly designate his thought as genuinely metaphysical in its most 
important and basic aspects, is to call his attention to the partially 
complete edition of the Opera of Ramon Lull prepared at the city ol 
Mainz between the years 1721 and 1742. 
Usually referred to as the Mainz edition, it is also described as the Ivo 
Salzinger edition in recognition of its industrious and learned e d i t o r . 1 3 
A cursorv reading of particularly the Liber Contemplationis in Deum, 
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one of the earliest and most magnificent literary productions to come 
forth from the prolific hands of the Mediaeval Mallorcan philosopher, 
suffices to establish beyond reasonable doubt the decisive place which 
' to-be' or 'being' occupied in his searching and penetrating mind. As if 
intent on showing the author 's keen interest regarding being, the scholars 
commissioned or entrusted with the preparation of the text of the 
treatises ultimately included in the edition frequently italicized the word 
'esse', especially in instances when the context clearly indicated that it 
had been used existentially, that is, with the meaning of 'to exist'. This 
leads the reader immediately to being struck by the realization of how 
often, already at the very beginning of the Liber Contemplationis in 
Deum, as well as later on, that infinitive form of the verb ' to be' appears, 
over and over again. This, without including the perhaps expectedly 
numerous times when the same verb is used in a simply non-existential 
role either as an auxiliary or a copulative verb. Some one may point out 
that the Latin text is only a translation from an earlier original Catalan 
version that Lull himself prepared from an even earlier version in the 
Arabic L a n g u a g e . 1 4 To that one can only say that, as is the case with 
most of the writings by the same author which have come down to our 
day in their Latin text —and they are by far the largest number— the 
Latin version was prepared by the author himself or by an associate 
under his direct and immediate supervision. At the very least the transla-
tion was examined by the author before it was allowed to be released 
under his n a m e . 1 5 Moreover it requires only a little attention to take 
notice of the faithfulness with which the meaning of the Catalan text of 
the Liber Contemplationis in Deum has been rendered and preserved in 
the Latin version. It will soon be noted too, that the Catalan 'esser, with 
or without an article before it, is regularly rendered by the Latin 'esse'. 
As already suggested, one need not read far into the Liber Contem-
plationis in Deum before he is made well aware of the author 's keen and 
enthusiastic intellectual concern for and commitment to being. After an 
introductory chapter, the first three chapters of that theological encyclo-
paedic work have for their subject-matter of theme, clearly enunciated in 
their titles, the esse or the existence of the entities most likely to interest 
man, namely God, himself and other rational, beings like h i m . 1 6 And 
though no separate t reatment is given to being itself until the tburth book 
in the 227th chapter, the all-pervasiveness and basic character of the 
perfection of esse looms large and clear at the beginning of the book. A 
proof of this lies in the admittedly large number of times that the word 
'esse' appears in those few early chapters. Limiting the count to instances 
in which the word is used existentially, whether as the infinitive form of 
the verb ' to be' or as a anoun or a substantive infinitive (in Catalan the 
distinction is often made easier by the presence of an article before' 
5 
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esser) we find that it was used a total of seventeen times in the first 
chapter alone, fourty-four times in the second chapter, and nineteen 
times in the third chapter. In other words in the relatively short space of 
three chapters the existential word 'esse' appears eighty times, without 
including any other form or tense of the verb. All of this in a book that 
has been described as one that contains, when not already well formed, at 
least in a germ state ready for future development, most of the principal 
ideas that would later distinguish and unify the philosophical vision of 
the Illuminated Doctor. 1 7 
Students accustomed to speaking of being in terms of the familiar 
analysis of essence and existence may object ot the apparent absence of 
that distinction in one of the earliest but major works of an author who 
insists on and stresses so clearly the perfection of being. To them it must 
be answered that the distinction was clearly known and accepted by him. 
In one of his other early writings we find these lines: 
Secundum discursum ipsorum F. G. recolit B. in creaturis 
inter esse et essentiam differentiam esse; quia vero A. cum 
majori nobilitate et virtute concordat, quam creatura, 
oportet, quod inter divinam essentiam et divinum esse 
nulla differentia s i t . ' 8 
What is read in many of his other works only reinforces the 
conviction that the author of the Liber Contemplationis in Deum 
possessed a deep awareness of the radical ontological worth of the 
perfection without which plainly nothing would be in existence. The 
reader soon comes to be certain that he is dealing with a thinker who has 
repeatedly and intensely experienced that intellectual vision or intuition 
that yields not only an authentic philosopher, but also one who is a 
metaphys ic ian . 1 9 
The being Lull speaks of, which he had intellectually experienced 
and grasped, is none other than the being that renders actual those 
beings that, because of it, literally are, or exist, for themselves. Such 
beings exist extramentally, "in re, extra vocem et etiam animam."20 In 
other words, they exist for and in themselves, independently of whatever 
other mode of being they may be said to possess elsewhere, be it in a 
more noble way within and as part of the divine knowledge which is one 
and identical with the Creator 's being, or in a less exalted one in the 
minds of other intellectual beings to whom they become present by and in 
their thought. Lull readily granted that objects and other entities may 
correctly be said to be when they are known or thought about. But this is 
very different from what occurs and from what we have when they possess 
an independent extramental being, independent not in origin and 
absolutely, save for the Divine Essence, but in that they are other than 
what is their idea or the thought about or of them. In the Liber Miran-
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darum Demonstrationum he wrote: 
Notum est, quod esse creaturarum sit in tr ibus modis: 
unus est, quod omnes creaturae sint in sapientia Dei: alter 
est, quod sint formaliter in anima, hoc est, in intellectu, 
qui illas intelligit: tertius est, quod sint in se ipsis. 2 1 
Of these three ways of being, the being clearly and vividly before the 
mind and soul of Lull was none other than the perfection of existence 
which alone permits us in the true sense of the word to designate 
something as real, or indeed as a real being. Such a being is real and 
exists extramentally because it is so fully constituted that it can and does 
exist by itself independently of, as other than, our thought. As stated 
before, that independence does not entail that the beings or realities in 
question do not receive their being originally and ultimately from the 
Supreme Existent, the Supernal Esse and Supreme Essence, who alone of 
all beings has the required nobility and perfection of being in order to be 
in esse eternally and infinitely through and because of I tself . 2 2 It was not 
his own thought, or the thought of others in the Supreme Mind, or even 
the being of himself or of others as present in his or some one else's 
thought and knowledge that ordinarily occupied the mind and drew the 
admirat ion of the author of the Liber Contemplationis in Deum, 
wonderful as those thoughts and that being in thought may be. Wha t he 
constantly contemplated and extolled was the being proper to each thing 
considered in itself, no matter how humble or exalted that particular 
thing may be. The esse could very well be that of the smallest inanimate 
object or it could be that of the Supreme Bonitas, one with the Supreme 
Esse, in whom an infinite to-be and a perfect to-be coincide and are 
perfectly o n e . 2 3 In either case it was the esse that allowed them to be in 
themselves, in re, extra vocem et animam. 
Certainly the titles of the chapters mentioned above show clearly and 
plainly that the being that inspired the wonder and joyful amazement of 
the Mallorcan philosopher does not reside or live in a realm of pure 
abstractions. Because of his lively concern with beings that exist concre-
tely in the realm of objective reality it may be said of him that he had no 
philosophy to teach other than the one he drew out of his own existence 
and that of others. Because of that, what Gilson has written of the Socra 
tes of old could also be said of Lull, namely that "he had no philosophy, 
he was i t . " 2 4 What interested him passionately was not an abstract 
existence, one that was some kind of neutral or isolated quality or 
condition which might be found or conceived apart by itself, a separate or 
separable property from those existents who are and exist through it or 
are one with it. Rather it was the existence of concrete existents which 
owe their being and concreteness to that existence whereby they are. 
If a writing deserves to be characterized as metaphysical because of 
1 
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its rational and penetrating examination and appreciation of reality from 
the standpoint of its being, —this in accordance with the Greek 
Philosopher's definition of Primary or First Philosophy as the scientific 
knowledge of being as being,— then it is correct to describe the Liber 
Contemplationis in Deum as a metaphysical work. We are not thereby 
excluded or prohibited from finding ample justification for the use of 
other descriptions, particularly when we are dealing with a book of an 
admittedly encyclopaedic scope and one that is also basically theological. 
Its encyclopaedic character should immediately be an indicator that the 
admiration for what is in existence and for existence itself present in the 
Liber Contemplationis in Deum is not limited exclusively to the being of 
God and the existence of men. The being of other, sometimes less noble, 
realities is also extolled on its pages. No created being could be totally 
incapable of arousing interest within the heart of one to whom a great 
Art was possible 
only if, all creatures being so many images of God, or at 
least his more or less remote imitations, their fundamental 
properties, and the mutual relations of these properties, 
enable us to^know the nature and attributes of G o d . 2 5 
A s proof of this all-encompassing admiration one may recall to mind the 
vonderful pages of Blanquerna and of Felix or The Book of Marvels.26 
There is no need however, to go beyond the early written Liber Con-
vemplationis in Deum to come across repeated chapters voicing admira-
tion and gladness over the reality of all created beings, intellectual or 
corporeal, rational or non-rational, spiritual or material, knowing and 
without knowledge. All that is in existence, no matter how small or 
superficially insignificant, can and may be an occasion for a man to 
marvel at and to arouse in him a prayerful admiration for the wonderful 
gift all existents have received, the gift of being, and some even of life. 
Chapter after chapter sings of the magnificent generosity of a Creator 
who in his eternal Goodness and infinite Power has brought into being 
something that heretofore had been literally n o t h i n g . 2 7 Amongst the new 
created entities stand out first, those noble spiritual substances we know 
as the a n g e l s . 2 8 A little lower in excellence we find other created beings 
in possession of, at least in part, a material element or aspect. But even 
these creatures provide abundant reasons for us to marvel at their abso-
lute reduction, directly or indirectly, from nothingness into a being. That 
reduction alone has enabled them to come into being at all. Occupaying 
the lowest rung of the ladder or scale of being one may speak of a prime 
matter produced out of nothing, a matter that is not produced from some 
pre-existing elements or from the substance of the Uncreated B e i n g . 2 9 
When it was made, prime matter became at once the primordial, formless 
and characterless stuff out of which corporeal things were to be subse-
3 
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quently m a d e . 3 0 First, it enters into the five elements which are then dis-
tributed into all the terrestrial and celestial b o d i e s . 3 1 Among the 
terrestrial beings one may well consider the many metals, of so great use 
and value in the lives of m e n , 3 2 or one may mention the plants, those 
creatures endowed with a vegetative n a t u r e . 3 3 Higher than the mentioned 
terrestrial natures but a little less excellent than angels are the various 
types and forms of a n i m a l s . 3 4 These with and in the species 'man ' 
combine or bring together in the most intimate conjunction the esse of a 
spiritual or intellectual order and the esse of a corporeal c o n d i t i o n . 3 5 
Amongst the objects that human thought grasps or in some limited 
fashion apprehends being stands out in a peculiar and privileged position 
This is brought out and made manifest by a striking linguistic fact. A 
number of languages, ancient and modern, encounter difficulties when 
giving expression to naming that which comes to out minds when we 
think or affirm being. This results in the apparent ambiguity enveloping 
the word. Could it be that the linguistic ambiguities and puzzles 
connected with the word 'being' arise as adumbrat ions of the fundamen-
tal, universal and transcendent character of that which being is, of that 
which makes a thing to exist extramentally from within itself and which 
we encounter in all that in some manner exists in its own right, in re, et 
extra vocem et etiam animam? There is of course, the more generai 
incommensurability that obtains between the more material faculty of 
speech and the immaterial thought that language endeavors but ofter 
fails adequately to express or at least comes short of capturing sufficientlv 
w e l l . 3 6 And we know also that thought itself is not without its weaknesses 
for it also fails to comprehend fully within itself the complete and entirf 
being of a single finite reality, including our o w n . 3 7 
A rather obvious ambiguity that thinkers have noted in connectior; 
wtth the term 'being' is that in some languages one and the same word is 
used to describe 1) ' taht which is' and 2) the wellnigh impossible-to-namt 
quality or feature which yet we must affirm as the characteristic that 
makes 'what is' or ' that which is' simply to be or to exist. We know tha> 
in English the word 'being' may at times be given the role of a noun and. 
in that case. it may have either the meaning of ' that which is', 'something 
that is', or the second and distinct meaning of 'existence'. Also the s a m t 
word can be declared to be the present participle or the gerund of the 
verb 'to be', the verb that, as it will be seen again. has as one of its prin 
cipal meanings that of 'to e x i s t ' . 3 8 Another way of saying this is tha: 
'being' may "mean either the subject that exists or the act that renders 
that subject ex i s t en t . " 3 9 In the English language the ambiguity of 'being' 
sometimes disappears when the word is preceded by an article. Both thc 
definite and the indefinite articles, as well as the addition of the 
plural-designating 's ' to the word 'being' , are sufficient to make it clear 
9 
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that we are dealing with a noun, and that is stands for the subjectis) tha t 
exist(s) or for the act-of-existence whereby entities a r e . 4 0 
Like English, the French and Italian languages also utilize one word 
to express what we have been speaking of. 'Etre' is the Franch word for 
'being' and 'essere the Italian one. In both cases one can readily see tha t 
the preference has been now, not for the participial or gerund form of 
English usage, but for the equivalent os the infinitive ' to be ' . In other 
words, French and Italian fall back upon the infinitive form of the verb 
'to be' and use it as a noun, in addition to its verbal f o r m . 4 1 When we 
turn to the Castillian or Spanish language we find it in the identical 
situation as French and Italian, a not strange occurrence since all three 
languages have been derived from the tongue spoken by the Romans, the 
conquerors who for centuries ruled the Mediterranean world. Like the 
other two previously mentioned romance languages, Spanish utilizes the 
infinitive form of the verb 'to be', i.e., 'ser either as a noun. with nearly 
the same meaning and function that the English 'being' has or as the in-
finitive of the verb 'to be', with both the signification of ' to exist' and its 
nonexistential copulative role. The writings of Martin Heidegger indicate 
that a similar situation obtains in the German language, and 'sein' invites 
a parallel discussion. 
On the testimony of Ramon Lull himself, we know that his writings 
were prepared in at least one, sometimes two, and occasionally three, of 
these languages: Catalan, his native tongue, Latin, the language of the 
educated and of the schools, and Arabic spoken by many in thirteenth 
century Mallorca and other parts of Spain recently recovered from the 
Moors or still under their rule. Unfortunately due to unders tandable 
historical circumstances none of the Arabic writings or versions are 
known to be extant. But it is certain that at least five or six were 
prepared by L u l l . 4 2 Of the books written in both of the other two 
languages however, we are fortunate still to have a total of 242 books, 
—not all of equal length and value—. Of them only fifty-two are today 
known in their Catalan versions. Some of the same fifty-two books are 
also preserved in Latin, in addition to the other 148 which are known 
only by their Latin t e x t . 4 3 Now if we pause to consider the two languages 
made use of by Lull in his extant writings, one of them, his native tongue 
Catalan, has a great similarity to the previously mentioned romance 
languages. Like them, it traces its beginnings back to Latin. It is also like 
them in that in Catalan the word 'esser' functions and has the meanings 
of the Spanish 'ser, the French '&tre' and the Italian 'essere'. If we next 
turn to the Latin language itself, whence the romance languages were 
derived, not strangely we also discover in it tha t one and the same word 
'ens manifests a similar ambiguity of meaning and of usage. It may be 
ised as participial verb-form or as a noun, subject to declension cases. It 
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may also mean a subject with the act-of-existence or the perfection 01" 
being itself. And of course, it can function as a participle of the verb 
'esse'.44 To what has been said of 'ens, it needs to be added that, as a 
matter of fact, the same ambiguity applies to and has been noted in 
connection with the infinitive 'esse in the writings of Mediaeval writers, 
including St. Tomas A q u i n a s . 4 5 
An examination of the writings of Lull on this point of the language 
concerning being, shows that frequently he had recourse to the Latin 
'esse' and to the Catalan 'esser when he wished to name that which we in 
English designate as 'being'. And of course, as the infinitives of their 
respective verbs, they may also be translated as ' to be'. Less frequently. 
except for many opuscula written in his late years, did he utilize the Latin 
'ens'. In most of the early writings when that word appears it conveys or 
translates the rather vague Catalan 'cosa' or the English ' t h i n g ' . 4 6 In the 
later writings, however, particularly in the opuscula of the Messina and 
Tunis periods, a little before his death at the end of 1315 or the early 
part of 1316, the words 'ens' and 'entia' signify more often than not the 
subject(s) that exist(s). Occasionally they stand for the property or perfec-
tion of being, expressed abstractly, as it were, in separation from the 
subjects that e x i s t . 4 7 It may also be noted that occasionally Lull relied on 
the word 'essentia', as he tells us in the Ars Brevis,4B to designate the 
perfection of being described in its purity as the entitative and dynamic 
quality through whose presence and possession only beings are or exist. 
In other words 'essentia may name, abstractly as it were, (because the 
focus of our attention is fully and exclusively on it) what we signify con 
cretely by means of the word 'being' , i.e., 'esse'. Lull suggests that we 
may do something very similar when we speak of 'bonitas and 
'bonum',49 provided we mean the words in the manner in which he 
intended them. 
As already noted, the reading of the Liber Contemplationis in Deum 
shows almost immediatley that, in addition to its role and function of an 
auxiliary verb, 'to be' is used regularly also with the existential meaning 
of 'to exist'. This usage is not limited for it extends to many other books 
by the same author. Likewise the infinitive forms 'esse' and 'esser are 
also very frequently used as is they were nouns with the signification or 
' the perfection-of-being'. That meaning is of course also intended by the 
verb itself when it is used existentially and with the various requirements 
of a verb. Bu{ it is rather exceptionally that the infinitive form, either in 
Catalan or in Latin, allows for a translation into 'a being' or 'beings'. In 
other words, it is only in rare instances that Lull relies on 'esse' or 'esser' 
to designate a concrete subject, one that has existence. There are two or 
three occasions however, in which it is clear that the infinitive form musi 
be translated as 'a beine'. 
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That the verb ' to be', including the case when its infinitive tbrm is 
used substantively as a noun, was frequently intended by the author of 
the Liber Contemplationis in Deum to signify the possession and active 
exercise of the act-of-existence, as in the well-known "I think, therefore I 
a m " of Rene Descartes, can be easily shown. For instance he writes thus : 
"Deus Pater, Domine universorum, quae s u n t ! " 5 0 Again: " O Domine 
Creator universorum, quae s u n t l " 5 1 Also: " . . .ut possimus probare, unum 
Deum esse, qui sine suis dignitatibus non posset esse: ut vero possimus 
probare, Deum e s s e . . . " 5 2 One of the rules of the Great Art Lull 
designated as 'utrum and he is clear t h a t by it we should unders tand: 
"u t rum hoc,de quo quaeritur, sit, vel non s i t " 5 3 
Both in Catalan and Latin, the use of the verb ' to be' in the infinitive 
form and with the meaning of 'existential act' or 'existence' is made 
evident by certain phrases that Lull seemed to enjoy repeating. They are 
variations of "esse in esse" Or "habere esse." Both of these basic expres-
sions, particularly the first one, Lull preferred to simply saying: 'esse', ' to 
be' or 'to exist'. For example, in the first few chapters of the Liber Con-
templationis in Deum he writes: "... est certe rationabile, quod nos, qui 
scimus, quod Tu sis in esse, laetemur in tuo esse, quia est in esse, et non 
in p r iva t ione . . . " 5 4 Again: "Nam homo debet laetari, quia lpse est in esse, 
et non est privatus ipso esse; igitur nos. qui sumus certi quod simus in 
esse, laetabimur; nam quinque sensus nobis demonstrant esse, in quo 
s u m u s . . . " 5 5 And: "...et nobis videtur, quod ipse non habuerit esse, nisi 
pro hoc m u n d o . . " 5 6 A last example: " . . .quibus potest homo vere 
percipere et cognoscere, quod Tu sis in esse, hoc est, quod habeas esse; 
quia esse, in quo Tu es et tua Essentia, est idem; sed quia inquirimus, an 
Tu sis in e s s e . . . " 5 7 
One may, almost at random, pick any passage of the Liber Contem-
plationis in Deum to demonstrate conclusively the existential meaning of 
the verb 'to be' for its author. With almost equal facility one could also 
show that 'esse and 'esser' are used as nouns. This task is sometimes 
made easier when either word is accompanied by an adjective. And with 
the Catalan esser the matter is simpler whenever the word is preceded 
by the definite article. We may give two or three examples: "Tibi , 
Domine, sit gloria... quod ei dederis esse humanum, quod est valde al tum 
et nobile d o n u m . " 5 8 "Quando contingit, quod ego cogitem in eventum 
mei esse, et videam. quod esse hominis sit nobilius esse, quod Tu 
c r e a s t i . . . " 5 9 In the Catalan language, we have the beginning of a passage 
quoted before: "... atorgada cosa es que 1 esser de les creatures e en. iij. 
m a n e r e s . . . " 6 0 
What , we may ask, can be said of the Latin word 'existentia and of 
the corresponding verb 'existere? In the early writings, these two Latin 
terms with all of their inflections were used rather sparingly, mostly with 
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a meaning that is not quite the one the words carry or connote t o d a y . 6 ' 
Their not too definite existential meaning reminds one of something 
written by Etienne Gilson. Speaking of the usage of existere during the 
century in which St. Thomas Aquinas lived, i.e., the thirteenth century, 
he tells us that the word had not yet clearly acquired the present meaning 
of 'actual existence' which it was to receive and have later o n . 6 2 Let us 
keep in mind that nearly three fourths of Lulfs fruitful octogenarian life 
and two thirds of his writing years were concluded prior to the close of 
that bright century of Mediaeval Scholasticism. When we examine the 
later books and opuscula63 we then find a further confirmation of 
Gilson's assertion for we come across an increased number of times in 
which Lull used the noun 'existentia' and the verb 'existere'. and this 
with signitications very close to those they have today. This occurs parti-
cularly in phrases that contrast doing and acting on the one hand, versus 
the underlying ontological structure of being from which action flows on 
the other. That ontological base or core would be ianctive, inert ana 
meaningless without its intrinsic dynamism that provided the crux oi 
Lull's attempted rational trinitarian 'demonstrations' . And that innet 
dynamism became then the source that may overflow outwardly into what 
to others is a more tangible or visible action. From this it is clear in any 
case that. when Lull throughout his writing years, used the noun esse' 
and the verb 'esse', not intending it simply as an auxiliary or a copulative 
attributive verb, he gave to those words the meanings ordinarily 
associated with the noun 'existence' and the verb 'to exist'. Undoubtedly, 
the fact that the substantive noun 'esse' is actually the infinitive form of 
the verb 'esse' means that what was intended by the thirteenth century 
writer was, and is, ordinarily understood by the verb. We find analogous 
usages when Lull, for instance, sometimes speaks of 'agere and of 
posse instead of 'actio and 'potentia'.64 It only needs to be added that 
when in later writings, we find the words 'existentia and 'to exist' we 
must remember that he then also had in mind what these words have 
since then ordinarily conveyed, without the corruptions to which 
existentialist philosophers have today exposed them when they arbitrarily 
corrupt their meaning and say that to exist is " to stand outside 
onese l f . " 6 5 What Maritain asserts of the verb 'to exist' in connection with 
the statement 'God exists' may also be applied to the meaning attached 
to ' to be' by the author of the Liber Contemplationis in Deum: "To say 
God is' and 'God exists' is to say exactly the same thing. One speaks the 
ianguage of simple truth in speaking of the ways through which it is 
shown that God is, or that God e x i s t s . " 6 6 
We have seen above that Lull was clearly aware of the three ways 
wherein things may properly be said to be: 1) in the wisdom of God, 2) in 
rhe knowledge had of them by intellectual beings other than the Suprc-
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mely Perfect Being and 3) in themselves, i.e., in re, extra vocem et etiam 
animam. He could also be more detailed or specific for in other places he 
describes the various types of beings that we may choose to consider. 
Certainly one may speak of many of the branches of the tree of being 
which provide the subject matter of philosophy. And these are: 
Ens, quod est Deus, ens, quod non est Deus. Ens, quod est 
reale, et ens, quod est phantast icum. Ens, quod est genus, 
et ens, quod est species. Ens, quod est movens, et ens, 
quod est mobile. Ens, quod est unitas, et ens, quod est 
pluralitas. Ens, quod est abstractum, et ens, quod est 
concretum. Ens, quod est intensum, et ens, quod est 
extensum. Ens, quod est similitudo, et ens, quod est 
dissimilitudo. Ens. Quod est generatio, et ens, quod est 
c o r r u p t i o . 6 7 
But even though he recognizes three principal ways of being with all 
their possible concrete applications, as indicated in the passage just 
quoted, Lulfs thought is mainly directed to that being in re, extra vocem 
et etiam animam that we also call real being. This is the being which, as 
said before, enables and makes things to exist in themselves extramen-
tally, with an independence that is of course, not absolute since they still 
receive their existence from an efficient cause outside themselves. But 
their independence is complete in the sense that they are not identical 
with a thought about them in the minds of either men or God. This is the 
kind of being that concerns the authentic metaphysician for "Metaphysi-
ca enim considerat res, quae sunt extra animam, prout conveniunt in 
ratione e n t i s . " 6 8 
When one reads the opening chapters of the Liber Contemplationis 
in Deum one is soon struck by the joyful strain that pervades nearly every 
line. The author 's blissful att i tude responded clearly to his keen 
intellectual grasp of and feeling for the meaning and value of existence in 
whatever form or expression it might take. A renunciation of wealth and 
wordly honors in order to answer the higher call to work towards the 
advancement of Christendom in a way he sincerely believed would prove 
efficatious did not entail, as it had not done so for Francis of Assisi 
either, that Lull was therefore barred from taking pleasure and delight in 
the thought and contemplation of the existence of things beautiful and 
good. In his view, it is right and reasonable; and men do well when they 
delight at seeing the greenery of blossoming trees beautifully adorned 
with colorful flowers and fruits, watered by winding clear streams and 
planted in lovely meadows or shade-providing fo res t s . 6 9 Why should their 
joy be lesser, the joy that men experience when they meditate upon the 
knowledge that they have "quod videant et sciant se esse in esse; nam qui 
laetatur de bonitate et pulchritudine, quae est extra se, multo magis 
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debet laetari, de ea, quae est intra s e . " 7 0 Again, do we not see that beasts. 
according to their own kind, are blissful and go about running and 
skipping in a very playful mood? Do not the innumerable birds of the air 
do likewise as they fly and sing in the sky? Even the fishes of the sea 
appear gleefully to swim about in the waters of the dark ocean and blue 
l a k e s . 7 1 If matters stand thus with animals and birds that do not think, it 
must be obvious that it is fittingiy and totally in accord with reason that 
men who are conscious of their own existence rejoice exceedingly on its 
account since we have the knowledge that "mul to melius esse in esse, 
quam eset, si non essemus in e s s e . " 7 2 In fact we should conclude, noi 
only that it is in perfect accord with reason but also that it is even i 
reverent duty and "homo debet mul tum laetari, quia ipse est in esse, et 
non est privatus ipso e s s e . " 7 3 The being and existence that we possess is 
not a matter of doubt for it is well attested. We know of it with both our 
intellect and senses " n a m quinque sensus nobis demonstrant esse, in quc 
sumus, quia oculis videmus, et auribus audimus, et naribus odoramur et 
ore gustamus, et carne s e n t i m u s . " 7 4 Does it not follow logically that since 
"ego in veritate sciam, me esse in esse, et videam, meum esse nullo modo 
esse in privatione, debeo inde laetari in tantum, quod tristitia nullo modo 
sit in me"? The joy and happiness that man ought to have during thc 
moments when he thinks of the immeasurably great good that is his 
simply through the fact that he is in existence, that he possesses being 
should be so overpowering that he should appear as a man intoxicated or 
at least as one dreaming. He should be as the man who suddenl) 
awakens from a distressing nightmare in which he has envisioned himselt 
dead to find himself in the full vigor of l i f e . 7 5 
There is not the slightest doubt that this all-pervasive happiness over 
the simple and glorious fact that we are in being can only be had and 
shared by a person who, in at least a feeble fashion, begins to grasp tho 
t remendous value of existence with something at least approaching the 
condition of a genuine appreciation of its decisive meaning and worth. 
Such a person will readily recognize that, with the possible exception oi 
the man who dies unreconciled to his Maker, "esse in esse", i.e., to have 
existence is by far a greater value than to be without that precious gift. 
Provided of course that a person lives in accordance with the require 
ments of being itself, to the question of 'whether to be or not to be iz 
preferable' there is but only one possible respohse. For on the one hand 
\ve have what is, or being, and on the other, nothing. And how can onc 
compare them, when nothing does not provide us with something tc 
compare? A man with a sound mind will not hesitate therefore. 
concerning the proper attitude and response he should take whenever a 
doubt should creep into his mind. He will know well: " . . .quid mihi plus 
valeat. ve! quod iniurier illudar. et vilipendar, et s:m in esse. vel quoci 
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non illudar, et non sim in e s s e . " 7 6 Certainly he will gladly choose to 
endure hunger and thirst, poverty and sufferings, great and small, if 
therein only lies the path to existence. And he will be able to see all 
things in their proper perspective because he will never forget tha t "mih i 
meiius sit esse in esse, quam si non essem in e s s e . " 7 7 As long as life will 
last for him, reason will demonstrate tha t "melius mihi sit, quod sim in 
esse sustinendo laborem, quam non habere e s s e . " 7 8 Instead of growing 
sad and dejected over the trials and tribulations of life, the man 
convinced of the magnificense of the gift of being and existence, parti-
cularly of an existence as a human being —because "esse hominis sit 
nobilius esse, quod Tu c r e a s t i , — " 7 9 will scarcely be able to contain his 
happiness. As a matter of fact tha t happiness will extend to every par t of 
his being, including every limb of his body. All of them, not only his 
heart and soul, have been endowed wfth existence and therefore, a man ' s 
joy should spread over to them a l s o . 8 0 
Of course, it is reasonable that each one of us rejoice because we are 
individually in existence. But it is also most reasonable that we acknow-
ledge the obligation ro experience joy over the being of one another, and 
this just like if the being of some one else were our o w n . 8 1 The being of 
other human beings ought to occasion in us, or be a recognizable cause 
of, as much joy, if only of course, we are good men. To a man of virtue 
whatever is good, no matter where or how found, is an occasion for 
gladness. And, if we think but a little, we shall easily recall tha t the being 
of another m a n is in itself a great good. Should a man prove better than 
ourselves because of a life lived closer to the Creator, it is only logical and 
right that we concede that the occasion for rejoicing is greater than the 
reasons for rejoicing that we may have over our own being. At least we 
should not allow ourselves to be less happy or sad since, in the instance 
of the man better than myself, a greater good follows and flows from his 
existence than from m i n e . 8 2 Every man should find this duty to rejoice, 
on account of the fact that others are in existence and have being, an 
easy duty to carry out. Indeed it almost seems an inclination given by 
nature, shared by all men and even non-rational animals, for each one to 
find pleasure and comfort in the company of his fellows. To be alone, 
without any friends or relatives, without at least the company of another 
single human being is something men have always found repugnant, for it 
saddens and terrifies most of t h e m . 8 3 Have we not observed how men 
assist and help each other in their various tasks and in the labors each 
undertakes for the purpose of acquiring material goods needed for, or at 
Ieast helpful towards, a good life? Is it not a cause for wonder that men 
should ever fail to rejoice in the good each one knows another man has 
by the simple and obvious fact that they are and that they are human 
b e i n g s ? 8 4 Should it ever occur that we are unable to grow happy in the 
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good of the existence of others for their own sake, at least we ought to 
find many and ample reasons to rejoice over their being because of the 
good that comes into our way on their account. None may deny however, 
that in this case there is a serious question about the authenticity of my 
love and happiness since I would then experience them rather on my 
account than t h e i r s . 8 5 The obligation to share in the happiness of others 
because they are existence will be satisfied only when we do not exclude a 
single human being. Our duty to be glad and happy extends not only to 
the existence of the good and just, but also to the existence of the evil 
and unjust. In the case of the latter it is useful to recall tha t the designs 
and justice of God are still fulfilled in the being of such men, and it is for 
that reason that we still have occasion to c e l e b r a t e . 8 6 
Now grave and great as it is "quod ego sim obligatus ad laetandum 
de meo esse, et de esse mei proximi, sed tota ista obligatio est quasi nihil 
respectu obligationis, in qua sum, laetandi de tuo e s s e . " 8 7 Man is not 
only obligated to find pleasure and joy in the Being of God, but he soon 
discovers, tha t it is impossible to find valid and enduring reasons for 
rejoicing over his own existence except after he has first learnt to delight 
in the Being of G o d . 8 8 This is therefore, and indeed, a most pleasant. 
fitting and reasonable obligation, one that confers great benefits on each 
one of us. Shall we find a man who fails to experience joy if he makes the 
discovery of a precious stone, one of exceeding value or some other great 
treasure? Is there a man who will not grow happy when he at long iast 
meets a brother or a son, unseen for many long years because of 
unavoidable trips to faraway distant lands? Certainly such men would 
have legitimate occasions to celebrate, even though fully aware that 
neither stone or treasure nor brother or son can bring any man to life, 
cure him of sickness, grant forgiveness of sins and lead into the 
everlasting life of h e a v e n . 8 9 Certainly it should be granted that it is 
certe rationabile, quod nos, qui scimus, quod Tu sis in 
esse, laetemur in tuo esse, quia est in esse, et non in pri-
vatione; nam qui laetatur de inventione rei finitae, est 
valde mirabile, si non laetatur de inventione rei in f in i tae . 9 0 
A man who fits the description at the end of this passage would assuredly 
give evidence of the height of foolishness for he utterly fails when, within 
his own mind, he assigns a totally inadequate value to an Infinite Being, 
thc Creator and Father who gives life and promises eternal j o y . 9 1 Let us 
think of men who decorate their homes and who see to it that they 
themselves, their children and their servants refrain from servile work on 
feast days and have the proper rest and leisure, fittingly to celebrate those 
happy occasions. Ought we not immediately to decide to begin an unbro-
ken and unceasing celebration that, as far as it lies within our power. wi!l 
be unending and everlasting in acknowledgement and blissful acceptance 
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of the Being of that Lord who has given us the grace to find h i m ? 9 2 To 
experience authentic joy and deeply felt gladness whenever we think of 
the Being of the Lord is a gift we must pray for and be thankful for. 
That gift and grace are, and will always be, more than our finite na ture is 
able to deserve and to contain. For it is only with God 's grace and favor 
that it can happen to a man that " suum cor natet in gaudio et laetitia, 
sicut piscis natans per mare; quod gaudium et laetitia, Domine, illi tunc 
venit quando considerat, quod tuum esse sit in e s s e . " 9 3 
The exultation and joyful att i tude towards being and existence in 
their many forms, repeatedly and clearly expressed in the writings of the 
Illuminated Doctor, stand out in stark and vivid contrast to the voices of 
anguish, anxiety, boredom and outright disgust tha t we sometimes read 
in and hear from our contemporary non-Christian Existentialist thinkers. 
Without the slightest doubt, underneath such striking differences lies the 
blissful confidence that the Mediaeval thinker had in the ult imate 
meaningfulness of existence. Reality is basically in accord with reason, if 
only we do not arbitrarily limit the understanding of the latter so as to 
exclude effectively the workings and designs of a Creative Intellect and 
Reason. Within the context of a Christian thought such as Lulfs, 
whatever being has existence finds a justification and final explanation in 
the wise and just dealings of a Creator whose Being of course, is not itself 
an anomaly. It is rather something absolutely required by its own singular 
perfection and nobility. "Nihil est in esse, Domine, quod habeat Dignita-
tem et proprietatem essendi Deus, nisi Tu t a n t u m . . . " 9 4 The God the 
Christian worships is a Lord who is just not only in his dealings but also 
in his own Being and with the being of all created t h i n g s . 9 5 For "...nisi 
justum esset quod nos essemus in esse, non essemus; et, nisi justum et 
rationabile esset quod essemus in adeo nobili dispositione, non haberemus 
adeo nobile esse sicut h a b e m u s . . . " 9 6 
We have received existence from One who is the "p r imum bonum 
mei esse. et pr ima causa, quae amat et dirigit meum e s s e " 9 7 and guides 
it therefore. under His own, always giving being to our being. From His 
invisible hand we have originally received and continue at each moment 
to receive our being and existence simply because in His eternal wisdom 
and freedom He has willed to grant us being. Were it not that the gift is 
unceasingly renewed by Him who alone has the power to sustain us in 
and with the same being He gave us initially and so generously, we would 
be no longer, for immediately and instantly we would perish and return 
to that state of nothingness from which we sprang forth through His gift 
of b e i n g . 9 8 Finite as we are, and of ourselves not worthy or capable of 
possessing being as something strictly due to our nature on account of 
some ownership title or of an exclusive and intrinsic worth rooted in our 
being, we ought always to remember that " sumus finiti intra mundum, 
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sumus finiti in esse et in operibus intra magnitudinem tuae sanctae 
E s s e n t i a e . " 9 9 In other words, our being, of itself near or close to the 
nothingness whence it c a m e 1 0 0 (and is shown and attested by our transi-
tion from non-being into being), as well as all the qualities which belong 
to our being, are tncreased and magnified whenever and according as it 
pieases the Creator of all t h i n g s . 1 0 1 
To a Christian thinker of the character and convictions of Ramon 
Lull, the gift of existence is most precious because it is the gift of 
something exceedingly good. To him, to be is good. For us to be and to 
exist is a good thing. Goodness is intrinsic to and inherent within being, 
so much so that goodness and being are convertible with each other. It is 
therefore, correct to say that the 'good' is but another name for being, 
because it names its inner and total character, as it were. God is, and He 
is good for He exists as goodness itselt In the plenitude and infinity of a 
superlative perfection, His existence is one and identical with His essence 
and with each and all of the Divine Names, or attributes, into which thc 
human intellect is forced to differentiate the one and single infinite reality 
that God is. This we do in order to conceive Him in some w a y . 1 0 2 One of 
the Divine names is Goodness. And because it is one with God 's own 
Being, Goodness alone explains sufficiently why His will determined to 
bring forth fmite beings into being, with a being other than His own 
Being, through a creative act that meant the outright gift of being 10 
something which apart from it had been and was, until then, nothing. 
One who has such a vision of reality can only conclude that being is 
invaluable and good. That is why we often find that Lull's repeated 
at tempts to explain and define the ontological foundations of all that is 
real or existent are, as a rule, preceded by either a brief or a long analysis 
and discussion concerning goodness and the many good things that man 
encounters in whatever direction he may turn. This he did without closine 
his eyes to the innumerable and formidable evils we face everyday. But he 
always endeovored to keep the gaze of his eyes upon what they ought to 
be searching for. Almost always as a result. those analyses begin with 
what clearly to the author was an obvious t ruth: "Bonitas est ens ratione 
cujus bonum est esse, et malum est non e s s e . " ' 0 3 
The trust and assurance of Ihe fundamental worth, meaning anci 
goodness of existence which are basic to the thought of the author of the 
Liber Contemplationis in Deum and which are reflected in the definition 
of goodness just quoted also found their expression in what, for all 
practical purposes, is a principle repeatedly found in many of his 
writings. That principle could very well be described as ' the principle of 
the perfection of being'. According to it we can assert that the worth and 
the perfection of any being are the measure. principle and rule against 
which the truth, force and validity of demonstrations that concern reality 
must be tested. The principle is not always worded in the same way in the 
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many different writings of Lull. But it always insists on the intimate bond 
between being on the one hand, and the good and perfection on the 
other. To be or to exist is to possess a genuinely distinct perfection and 
nobility. On the other hand, the perfection of anything is and must be 
gauged by its being. The degree and the mode of a thing's being are 
accurate indicators of its perfection and worth. And by the same token, 
the degree to which a reality or some one thing may, in its own way, 
approximate or share in non-being, that same degree marks the point at 
which imperfection, badness or evil enters into that reality as into its 
s u b j e c t . 1 0 4 The non-being which is the source of imperfection can of 
course, be described by different names. One given to it by the Cata-
lan-Mallorcan philosopher is 'privation', a word that he himself cautions 
may be understood either in an unqualified sense (and then it is 
equivalent to absolute nothingness or non-being), or in a limited sense 
(and then its meaning is the more usual one, of a lack of what is due or 
fitting). In a passage defining the meaning of privation Lull gives clear 
signs of his solid understanding of what is conceived as real. He writes: 
Tu scis quod privatio dividatur in privationem generalem 
et privationem specialem: privatio generalis est nihil quia 
nulla res nec accidentalis nec substantialis potest esse in ea 
nec per eam, cum nulla res sit ei subjecta nec ipsa sit 
subjecta ulli rei; sed privatio specialis est unum de tribus 
principiis, sine quo m a t e r i a . . . 1 0 5 
With that opposition between being and non-being in mind we can 
weli appreciate what was called above the principle of the perfection of 
being. Many are the passages one could select in which Lull conveys his 
principle. The following two are sufficiently clear to understand his 
meaning and are quoted without any further explanation: 
...et hoc est impossibile, quia natura perfectionis non con-
venit cum privatione, et convenit cum esse, et na tura 
defectus non convenit cum esse, et convenit cum priva-
tione; et per hoc significatur, quod multo plus perfectionis 
sit in esse, quam in privatione, et multo plus defectus sit in 
privatione, quam in e s s e . 1 0 6 
Again: 
Intellectualiter certificatum et demonstra tum et significa-
tum est quod esse habeat concordantiam et propinquita-
tem cum perfectione, et non esse habeat concordantiam et 
propinquitatem cum defectu; quia, sicut non esse venit a 
defectu, ita esse venit a perfectione: igitur, cum hoc tta sit, 
esse et perfectio aequaliter se respiciunt secundum rela-
tionem ad non esse et defectum, et non esse et defectus 
aequaliter se respiciunt secundum relationem ad esse et 
pe r fec t ionem. 1 0 7 
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Clearly in the eyes of the Illuminated Doctor Existence, the 
perfection and act of being is fundamental to whatever is real. Without it, 
i.e., without being, there is no reality to speak of. All values and perfec-
tions presuppose being and we may say that, in a sense, they are being 
itself for without it they are nothing and have nothing. If it cannot at all 
be said of something that it has being or existence then it has no values, 
properties, conditions or qualities that permit us to compare it with 
something else that truly is. Even the most insignificant creature has 
some value and a degree of perfection. These are completeiy absent from 
that which is nothing because it has no existence. And the conviction with 
which that simple truth is held is based on evidence that is felt even with 
our sentient nature. 
Sensualiter sentimus et intellectualiter intelligimus quod 
esse sit valde melius quam non esse, quia non esse non 
significat in se ullan virtutem, quoniam si eam signiticaret 
non esset non esse imo esset esse; sed, quia esse est in esse, 
significat in se virtutem quae non significatur in non esse; 
igitur, cum hoc ita sit per hoc significatur quod esse 
secundum respectum ad non esse sit res bona, et non esse 
secundum respectum and esse non sit res bona nec habens 
ullam v i r t u t e m . . . 1 0 8 
The metaphysical questions intimately connected with our understan-
ding of being are many and wide-ranging. To go into them for their own 
sake would certainly dee-per our knowledge of being further. And to do 
so with the thought of our thirteenth century Catalan philosopher and 
Christian missionary writer would prove most illuminating. His proofs for 
the existence of God for example, and the distinctive doctrine of the Divi-
ne Attr ibutes which he liked to refer to as 'dignitates' show, again and 
again, that , to be fully appreciative of them, one must previously unders-
tand and uphold the closest and most intimate bond obtaining to the 
point of identity, between perfection and being. Lulfs genuinely Christian 
unders tanding of Creation likewise stands out in its stresses on the trans-
cendence of the Infinite. Eternal and Uncreated One, without therebv 
destroying the worth of finite creatures. What is most admirable and 
stupendous about Creation is the marvellous transition from non-being to 
being effected and brought about by Him who alone has the dignity and 
perfection of Being per se ipsum eternally and infinitely. To do more than 
to allude to these and other important doctrines found in the writings of 
Lull would require a lengthier t reatment than is possible in this article. It 
can only be hoped that what has been said is more than sufticient to 
bring out clearly how the Illuminated Doctor had a fine feeling for and 
keen appreciation of being. Consequently about him one may have to 
agree that indeed he must be counted amongst those who have had an 
2 1 
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authentic grasp and intellectual vision of being. That vision of course, is 
none other than the priviledged intuition of being tha t makes of a th inker 
not just a philosopher but a metaphysician, for, in the case of our Illumi-
nated thinker. it was " the intuhion of being in hs pure and all-pervasive 
properties, in its typical and primordial intelligible density; the intuition 
of being secundum quod est ens.109 
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